1. On any plausible view, there are some things that you are justified in taking for granted, and other things that you are not justified in taking for granted. 2 One way in which someone might be subject to legitimate criticism for taking something for granted
is this: what he or she takes for granted isn't true. (If you point out that something that I'm taking for granted is false, then I should stop taking it for granted.) It also seems that someone is subject to legitimate criticism for taking for granted something that it is unreasonable to think is true. (If you point out that something that I'm taking for granted is unlikely to be true given our evidence, then it seems like I should stop taking it for granted.) Putting these points together, one might think that a relevant norm here involves knowledge:
One should only take for granted what one knows.
In fact, I'm inclined to think that this is a genuine norm. "Don't take for granted things that you don't know to be true" has the ring of truth, at least to my ear. It's the 1 A notable exception among the latter is Bratman (1999) . 2 Here as elsewhere, talk of 'justification' suggests something more akin to permission than to requirement or obligation. But plausibly, and although Harman and Sherman don't say this explicitly, there are some cases in which it's not only permissible to take something for granted but in which it would be impermissible or inappropriate not to do so. For example, consider a detective who is charged with solving some crime, but who spends his time reading philosophy journal articles in an attempt to get a better handle on the seemingly more fundamental question of whether it might all be one big dream. Such a detective is subject to criticism for not taking enough for granted: he is failing to take something for granted that he should take for granted, given his purposes, etc. Having noted this, I will set it aside in what follows.
kind of thing that one might tell one's children and feel like one is both giving good advice and speaking the truth. Consider also the following faux paus, frequently committed by academics as well as others. Suppose that you are in a small group that is discussing politics, and a colleague is carrying on. It's clear from the way the colleague is carrying on that he's simply assuming or taking for granted that everyone else in the group shares his view about some issue. In fact, however, that assumption is false.
Suppose that later on you point this out to your colleague: "You know, you were just assuming that everyone shared your view that p, but so-and-so doesn't: in fact, she thinks that not-p". The colleague might react with surprise: "I didn't know that!--I was just taking it for granted that everyone there thought that p". No doubt, the colleague was genuinely ignorant of the fact that not everyone in the group shared his view. But it seems that, given that he didn't know that everyone else shared his view, he shouldn't have simply assumed that they did. One shouldn't take for granted things that one doesn't know to be true.
Thus, I'm inclined to endorse the "knowledge norm" for assuming or taking for granted. I do this not only because treating knowledge as the norm for various things is all the rage these days, and it would be nice to get in on the action, but because (at least in this case) that's where the truth seems to lie. Of course, that isn't what Harman and Sherman think. Indeed, their central and most striking claim is that, in some cases, one's knowledge might rest on assumptions that are not themselves known but rather justifiably taken for granted. They give the following examples:
(1) You might know that your car is outside in front of your house. This depends on your assuming that your car has not just been stolen, something that you do not know, but rather justifiably take for granted (p. x).
(2) You might know that you will be in Paris next year. This depends on your assuming that you will not die before then, something that you do not know, but rather justifiably take for granted (p. x).
(3) You might know that you are seeing a desk by taking for granted, but without knowing, that you are not a brain in a vat (p. x).
(4) You might know that you will be at the arrivals gate following your flight, although you merely take for granted (and do not know), that the plane will not crash (p. x).
(5) You might know that you are in your kitchen, although you do not know (but only take for granted) that you are not merely dreaming (p. x).
According to Harman and Sherman, "Part of the explanation of your knowing that your car is presently parked outside is that you justifiably (and truly) take it for granted that the car hasn't been stolen" (p. 2). A question that we might ask at this point: Given the assumption that your car has not been stolen is true, and is something that you justifiably take for granted, what prevents you from knowing the relevant proposition?
Not, presumably, that you don't believe that your car has not just been stolen, for Harman and Sherman explicitly allow that you might very well fully believe or accept propositions of this sort (p.2). Nor, presumably, is it that you are not in a position to know because you are in some kind of classic Gettier-type situation, in which your justified true belief rests on a false lemma. So what is it, exactly, that prevents you from knowing that your car has not just been stolen in a case in which you truly believe that proposition on the basis of those considerations which justify you in assuming that it's true? Why are these beliefs falling short of knowledge?
Harman and Sherman are rather coy when it comes to providing the kind of general principles that might shed light on this. They write: "While we agree that it would be nice to provide such principles, we do not see it is any objection to our commonsensical approach that we have failed to do so" (p.18). Fair enough; I agree that not providing principles of the relevant kind is not itself an objection to the account on offer. However,
given the examples that they employ throughout the paper, there is a natural thought about what the relevant general principle is. (That is, there is a natural thought about what general principle might explain why you are not in a position to know that your car has not just been stolen, even when that assumption successfully underwrites your knowledge that your car is parked in front of your house.) Namely, your belief that your car has not just been stolen is not sensitive: if in fact your car had just been stolen, you would nevertheless still believe that it had not just been stolen, albeit in that case falsely.
On the other hand, your belief that your car is parked in front of your house is sensitive:
if you hadn't parked it in front of the house, you would have put it in the driveway (etc.), in which case you would not believe that it is parked in front of the house. The same is true, I think, of all of the examples provided by Harman and Sherman of cases in which a proposition is known partially on the basis of a second proposition that is not known but rather taken for granted: belief in the proposition that is known is sensitive, while belief in the proposition that is merely taken for granted is insensitive. (Or at least, it's natural to hear the stories in that way.) So one way in which someone might be led to the account on offer is the following: one might think, with Nozick (1981) , that sensitivity (or rather, some suitably-refined sensitivity condition) is a necessary condition for knowledge. 2. Imagine a theorist who accepts Harman and Sherman's account but who does not think that sensitivity is a necessary condition for knowledge. Such a theorist might tell an alternative story about why one might not be in a position to know some true proposition even if one fully believes it and is justified in assuming that it is true. Specifically, such a theorist might think the following: although it makes sense to talk about one's beliefs as justified and unjustified, and it similarly makes sense to talk about one's assumptions as justified or unjustified, the kinds of considerations that are relevant to whether one is justified in assuming p (or taking p for granted) are quite different from the kinds of considerations that are relevant to whether one is justified in believing p. That is:
justification for a belief is one thing, justification for an assumption is another, even if it's the same proposition which is both believed and assumed.
In particular, it is at least somewhat plausible to think that whether one is justified in Harman's and Sherman's account would have a good answer to the question: "Why aren't you in a position to know any true proposition which you fully believe and justifiably assume to be true?" Namely: the kinds of considerations which justify you in assuming that some content is true are not the same kinds of considerations which would justifying you in believing that that content is true, in the sense of 'justification' relevant for knowing.
In fact, I suspect that this is probably not what Harman and Sherman think. For I suspect that at least Harman is too much of a pragmatist to think that there is such a thing as "purely epistemic justification", which plays an important role in epistemology. But I mention this theoretical option both because I think that it would be interesting to explore, and also because I myself think that the relevant assumptions (viz. whether one is justified in taking something for granted depends on the expected utility of doing so, but whether one is justified in believing the same proposition is not a matter of expected utility) are actually true. I do not know whether or not I am a brain in a vat without hands. I think that I have hands. In thinking that I have hands, I assume that I am not a brain in a vat without hands. As far as I can see I am justified in taking that for granted and, given that assumption, I know that I have hands. So I do not know whether or not I am a brain in a vat without hands but I do know that I have hands.
As I said, my own reasons for thinking that some closure principle is true are pretty much the standard ones. 6 These considerations evidently don't impress Harman and Sherman, so for that reason I won't go on about this too much. But I do want to say something about how their line on "abominable conjunctions" interacts with certain big picture methodological issues about how we should score alternative views in this area.
Harman and Sherman seems to be very much a "bottom-up" as opposed to "top-down" approach". They don't begin with a commitment to general theoretical principles about knowledge and then evaluate particular claims about what we know and don't know in the light of those principles. Rather, their starting point is what we would ordinarily take ourselves to know: among those things that we assume or take for granted, we would not ordinarily take ourselves to know that we will not be hit by a bus or die of a fatal heart, or that our ticket will lose the lottery, or that our car has not just been stolen (etc.). The task is then to show how these particular judgments can be reconciled with other intuitively compelling, particular judgments: that we do know the car is parked in front of the house, that we will not have enough money to take an unusually large number of trips this year, and so on. At one point, they emphasize that the fact that theories such as Dretske's (1970) and Nozick's (1981) have problems does not undermine the intuitive nature of the knowledge claims that originally motivated those theories (p.13). At the end of the paper, in the context of rejecting the suggestion that it is incumbent upon them to provide more general epistemological principles, they describe their own approach as a "commonsensical" one (p.18). Throughout the paper then, one gets the sense of theorists who are giving a great deal of weight to preserving common sense judgments about the truth of particular knowledge claims. (As opposed to theorists who are prepared to be extremely revisionary about such judgments if they turn out to conflict with more abstract, theoretical principles about knowledge, etc.)
As a methodological matter, I think that this is generally the right way to go, both in epistemology and elsewhere: I'm all for giving a great deal of weight to our considered judgments about particular cases. But I worry that this background picture exacerbates the awkwardness of dealing with abominable conjunctions by classifying them as "true, but pragmatically odd to assert". After all, when we judge that "I know that I have hands, but I don't know that I'm not a handless brain-in-a vat" is false, what we are reacting to are not abstract, general principles about knowledge, but rather particular knowledge claims and how such claims bear on one another. Of course, perhaps the puzzles in this area are so difficult that any theory will ultimately have to give up some very intuitive claims, and appeal to some story involving pragmatic phenomena in order to explain away the intuitions that the theory fails to accommodate. But one might think that having to tell such a story about abominable conjunctions is a greater embarrassment for a view that generally privileges (or at least, gives a great deal of weight to) our more low-level particular judgments.
